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The Weekly Fix: Markets Signal Impatience for a Fed Response

Fixed Income
Bloomberg

Welcome to the Weekly Fix, the newsletter wondering when the Federal Reserve will acknowledge that there's already been a material change to the outlook. –Luke Kawa, Cross-Asset Reporter and Tracy Alloway, Executive Editor

Yet to Turn

The divergence between the Federal Reserve's words and the market's actions has gapped wider. The worst weekly equity rout since 2008 has prompted traders to price in a near lock on a March interest-rate reduction, with the odds topping more than 96% at one point on Thursday.

Yet Fedspeak during the week betrayed little sense of alarm, or change in circumstances:

Richard Clarida: "monetary policy is in a good place" and "it is still too soon to even speculate" about the impact of the coronavirus on the outlook for U.S. activity.

Loretta Mester: "monetary policy is well calibrated to support our dual mandate goals, and a patient approach to policy changes is appropriate unless there is a material change to the outlook"

Charles Evans: "It would be premature, until we have more data and have an idea of what the forecast is, to think about monetary policy action"

Former officials are divided on whether the central bank should act or wait.

The case for inaction is forcefully articulated by Tom Porcelli at RBC Capital Markets:

"The markets are calling for policy prescriptions that address demand shocks to solve what is a potential transitory supply shock driven by pandemic fears. Even if it gets worse, unless you all of a sudden think we are looking at a 1918 Spanish Flu-like event, this too shall pass, folks."

"Cutting now when Fed funds is already sitting 100 basis points below neutral further cements the dangerous precedent already set that the only independent variable in the policy reaction function that matters is what the S&P 500 is doing of late."

The counter-argument is that even if all Fed rate cuts could do is help put something resembling a floor under an equity market failing to respect so-called support levels, that could still be help worth having.

The central bank's policy works by influencing financial conditions, of which the stock market forms a major part. Since one of the primary channels through which the coronavirus could affect the U.S. economy is public confidence (and in turn, consumption), the stock market's typically strong connection with measures of sentiment would argue for an aggressive approach aimed at shoring up both.

History shows a severe stock swoon in itself can constitute a material change to the outlook, regardless of the trigger. Hedge fund legend George Soros famously made the argument for reflexivity: that market participants can bring about the economic outcomes that they price in.

Analysis of the repricing in the front end of the curve suggests that the Fed will cut rates in March or April, if policy makers keep with precedent that's held since the 1980s.

The Fed isn't alone in its seeming reluctance to take rates lower in response to the coronavirus despite the wishes of the markets. President Christine Lagarde doesn't see a need for the European Central Bank to do anything yet. The Bank of Korea also didn't cut rates in its Thursday decision, electing to deliver targeted loan support for affected firms.

The longer that central bank communications fail to express a willingness to act proactively to prevent a material shock to demand, the greater the likelihood such a shock materializes. That could be the case even if – once again – a muscular fiscal policy response would be most effective in mitigating both risks to public health and activity.

Early 2019 offers a playbook for today. The market's looking for action, but words would be a start. There's plenty of opportunity, with over a dozen speaking appearances from Fed regional presidents and governors before the traditional communications-blackout period ahead of the March 17-18 policy meeting.

In the short term, the equity market faces a head-on collision between a desire to avoid having to hold risk over the weekend and one of the best months for long bonds relative to stocks on record. The former would argue for another messy session on Friday, the latter would suggest rebalancing could buoy risk assets on the final trading day of the month.

BB-ware

The price of credit means nothing if the access to it is curtailed.

So even with investment-grade and high-yield borrowing costs still close to record low levels, the lack of new issuance in the credit markets (ex-China!) should send something of a shiver down investors' spines.

Once again, energy-sector bonds are bearing the brunt of the damage in high yield in the U.S., where the HYG ETF suffered massive outflows.

It seems like just yesterday when this newsletter flagged worries about borrowing-base re-determinations putting the squeeze on energy companies – but that biannual bugbear is around the corner again.

Bloomberg Intelligence analyst Spencer Cutter highlights that the share of junk energy bonds trading at distressed prices surged to 35% as of Tuesday, the highest proportion since 2016.

Bloomberg Intelligence

Bloomberg Intelligence

The 2015-16 experience showed it took a while for lenders to cut back, but when they did, it was a key contributor to corporate closures.

"The vast majority of energy-sector bankruptcy filing in the previous downturn occurred around the spring 2016 borrowing-base redetermination process," adds Cutter.

The more pervasive worry for the junk space may be the speed at which short-term spreads are being repriced. This newsletter highlighted in January that one of the top charts to watch in 2020 was the gap between short-term borrowing costs for the most creditworthy junk-rated firms compared with those of the U.S. government. As highlighted then, this is where concerns about an imminent downturn should become manifest. 

All of a sudden, vigilance on this front is now warranted. While still low by historical standards, BB two-year spreads have widened by more than 80 basis points over the past nine sessions, the briskest such blowout since early 2010. The rate of change may be more important than the outright levels in ascertaining how concerned investors are at present, and how the marginal borrower might be affected as a result.

 

Vexing Bunds

One reason the coronavirus has spooked financial markets is because of the perception that it's a threat of unknown magnitude to the global economy.

But there is no one making the case that the U.S. will be more adversely impacted by the coronavirus than Germany. And yet the 10-year Treasury yield is on track to fall by more than 10 basis points relative to the German bund yield for back-to-back months for the first time since 2010.

The reason for this seemingly incongruent state of affairs is simple, according to Morgan Stanley's Michael Kushma: "The U.S. Treasury market is the safe asset for the entire world."

The implication is that the relative rallies are not indicative of the relative potential economic implications, but a function of preferred hedging vehicles among financial market participants. On the other hand, the ferocity of the decline in the two-year Treasury yield suggests that downside risks are still top-of-mind.

On that note, if there's a pick to be made for which Treasury curve to be more afraid of – between the majorly inverted three-month, 10-year or the briskly steepening 2s10s, it's probably better to go with the latter. Bull-steepening there is implying the kind of Fed response associated with a recession. Then again, the sample size on Treasury-market dynamics ahead of downturns is sufficiently small that drawing firm conclusions from historical patterns remains a mug's game.

Tie all this together, and the biggest puzzle in the sovereign-bond market isn't why U.S. Treasury yields have tumbled to all time lows, but why their German counterparts remain 20 basis points above their record lows.

CDX Marks the Spot

Given the sharp sell-off in corporate debt in cash trading, it's worth checking in on credit derivatives. While single-name credit-default swap protection has fallen out of favor since the credit crisis, buying and selling protection on whole indexes has been a popular macro play and overlay hedge for years.

Even more popular has arguably been derivatives tied to these same derivatives indexes (derivatives squared?). Trading of options on the CDX, which give users the right to buy or sell the underlying index, is said to have boomed in recent years. The concern now is that these CDX index options (also known as swaptions) could come back to haunt the market in an underappreciated way. That's because dealers who write these contracts typically have to hedge their exposure by buying more CDX protection as risk premiums go up – as they have done this week. That hedging dynamic could exacerbate the move in the underlying indexes and eventually impact the whole market. It's a scenario that Barclays analysts have previously dubbed the "option tail wagging the index dog" and it bears watching now.

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